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 Sel￿sh Bakers, Caring Nurses?
A Model of Work Motivation
Karine Nyborg and Kjell Arne Brekke￿
Abstract
Work contributes to people￿ s self-image in important ways. We propose a model in which
individuals have a preference for being important to others. This leads to the following predictions:
1) In fully competitive markets with performance pay, behavior coincides with the standard model
(bakers). 2) In jobs where e⁄ort is not rewarded according to its social marginal value, behavior is
more socially bene￿cial than predicted by the standard model (nurses). 3) Even if unemployment
bene￿ts provide full income compensation, many workers￿utility strictly decreases when losing
their job. 4) Similarly, many workers will prefer to work rather than to live o⁄ welfare, even with
full income compensation. 5) To keep shirkers out of the public sector, nurses￿wages must be
strictly lower than private sector income. At this wage level, however, the public sector will be too
small. 6) It is possible to attract motivated workers to the public sector, without simultaneously
attracting shirkers, through capital input improving nurses￿opportunity to do a good job.
￿Both authors: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O.Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway. E-
mails: k.a.brekke@econ.uio.no, karine.nyborg@econ.uio.no. The main part of this paper was written while both authors
were employed by the Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research. We are grateful to the Research Council of Norway
for funding through HERO (the Health Economics Research Programme at the University of Oslo), and to numerous
seminar and conference participants for their helpful comments.
1"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (Smith 1776, par. I.2.2).
"How sel￿sh soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary
to him." (Smith 1759, par. I.I.I)
1 Introduction
The Homo Oeconomicus model, which assumes that individuals care only about their own access to
goods and services while keeping their own e⁄orts low, has long been the benchmark for economic
analyses of labor markets and worker behavior. Recently, however, several researchers have explored
the idea that workers may have various kinds of altruistic or social preferences (e.g. Benabou and
Tirole 2006, Dur and Glazer 2005, Besley and Ghatak 2005, Francois 2000, 2005, Heyes 2004, Frank
2003). One reason for this interest is that empirical observation often seems hard to reconcile with
the stark Homo Oeconomicus predictions: If Homo Oeconomicus is paid by a ￿xed wage, for example,
and e⁄ort is unobservable, he will exert no e⁄ort above the absolute minimum required to keep his
job. Anyone who has spent some time at a hospital, a school, or a university, knows that although
this description might ￿t the behavior of some individuals, it de￿nitely does not ￿t all. Indeed, within
health economics, the assumption of altruistic physicians has become widely used in recent years,
presumable since without it, model predictions are simply too di¢ cult to reconcile with the empirical
evidence.1
Nevertheless, there are numerous cases in which the standard model appears to be perfectly ade-
quate: Personally, we have yet to see, for example, economic analyses of altruistic stock market brokers,
bakers, or butchers. If empirical observations seem to indicate that behavior is inconsistent with the
Homo Oeconomicus model in some occupations, but not in others, it is unsatisfactory to "explain"
this by simply assuming that certain occupations are populated by particularly nice individuals.
Our approach in the present paper is to propose a very general model of work motivation. We
assume that every individual has the same preference structure, while allowing the strength of work
motivation to vary between individuals. This model is then used to determine e⁄ort levels and self-
selection into di⁄erent types of jobs endogenously.
Our main proposal is that work is partially motivated by a desire to keep a self-image as someone
1"A substantial part of the physician￿ s satisfaction with practice is ful￿lled by serving successfully as the patient￿ s
advocate. (...) The unifying hypothesis is that physicians do have personal utility for their patients￿bene￿t" (Eisenberg
1986, pp. 57 and 61). See also Jack (2005), Ma (2004), Grytten and Słrensen (2001, 2003), De Jaegher and Jegers
(2000), Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), Farley (1986), Woodward and Warren-Bolton (1984).
2who is important to others. While self-image is not a standard ingredient in economic models, other
social sciences provide strong arguments for including self-image as an object of preference. Aronson
et al. (2005, p.166), for example, summarize as follows: "During the past half-century, social psychol-
ogists have discovered that one of the most powerful determinants of human behavior stems from our
need to preserve a stable, positive self-image". While "being important" is hardly the only aspect of
self-image that people care about, it is the only aspect we focus on here; note, in particular, that we
abstract from any preferences for social approval from others.2
Introducing the preference for a self-image as important to others into an otherwise quite standard
economic model has a number of implications. For jobs where e⁄ort is remunerated by its marginal
productivity, our model is behaviorally equivalent to the Homo Oeconomicus model. In jobs where
neither individual e⁄ort nor individual productivity is veri￿able, however, workers will behave more
altruistically than predicted by the Homo Oeconomicus model. Thus, the very same person may
appear to be "sel￿sh" if she works as a baker, but not if she switches jobs and becomes a nurse. Turning
next to the issue of self-selection into di⁄erent occupations, we show that under plausible conditions,
those with intermediate preferences for being important will seek private market employment, while
the "public" sector ￿that is, the sector in which neither individual e⁄ort nor individual productivity
can be veri￿ed ￿will be attractive both for those with the highest and those with the lowest work
motivation.3 The highly motivated are attracted by the opportunity to be important; the poorly
motivated are attracted by the opportunity to shirk.
Since behavior in perfectly competitive market jobs is una⁄ected by the preference to be important,
it is socially desirable that poorly motivated workers choose employment in the private sector. This can
be achieved by keeping public sector wages low.4 Hence, while both the pro￿t maximizing behavior
of the baker and the other-regarding behavior of the nurse are consistent with exactly the same
underlying preferences, self-selection could cause a higher concentration of strongly other-regarding
individuals in the public sector.
Here, the regulator faces a di¢ cult trade-o⁄: If the wage is kept su¢ ciently low to keep all shirkers
out, the size of the public sector will be strictly smaller than the ￿rst-best optimum. We show, however,
that if the regulator improves nurses￿opportunity to do a good job, by investing capital increasing
their productivity, the public sector becomes more attractive for the highly motivated, while poorly
motivated workers are una⁄ected. This provides, in fact, an argument for overinvestment of certain
types of public sector capital.
2See Benabou and Tirole (2006). In their model, voluntary contributions can be used to signal, either to others or
to oneself, that one is a "nice person".
3This is closely related to the ￿ndings of Prendergast (2006), Delfgaauw and Dur (2004) and Heyes (2004).
4For a related argument, see Frank (2003).
3While our approach has much in common with several of the papers quoted above, it is distinct
from each of them in important ways. The most important distinguishing feature of our analysis, we
believe, is that the proposed preference structure is very general, not speci￿cally linked to the type
of employment or production that we study. In contrast to Francois (2000, 2003, 2005) and Besley
and Ghatak (2005), for example, there is no implication that the most "altruistic" workers are those
with a particularly strong preference for the speci￿c good they are producing - in fact, we assume that
everyone has the same preference for the public good.
The general nature of the self-image function implies that our model can also be used, for instance,
for analyzing individuals￿preferences between working ￿supporting themselves and paying taxes ￿or
living o⁄ welfare (for example as a recipient of unemployment, sickness or disability bene￿ts). Our
model may explain the fact that even in the generous Scandinavian welfare states, substantial numbers
of individuals do not exploit the opportunity to live o⁄welfare to the extent they actually could. Below,
we show that for most workers (although not all), becoming unemployed will be associated with a net
loss of utility, even if unemployment bene￿ts provide full income compensation. The model thus o⁄ers
one possible explanation for the substantial evidence indicating that unemployment is a major cause
of reduced happiness and life satisfaction (see, for example, Lane 1991, Oswald 1997, Theodossiou
1998).
2 The model
Assume that every individual i = f1;:::;Ng has preferences of the following type:
Ui = u(bi) ￿ c(ei) + ￿G + Si (1)
where bi is i￿ s consumption of a (numeraire) private good (for example, bread); ei is i￿ s e⁄ort; G is
the level of a pure public good (for example, preventive public health care), and Si is i￿ s self-image.
u is a strictly concave and increasing function, while c, the cost function for e⁄ort, is strictly convex,
increasing in ei, satisfying c(0) = 0. E⁄ort levels are unobservable. ￿ > 0 is the ￿xed marginal utility
of the public good. The functional form is chosen for simplicity.
We assume that individuals have identical skills. Each individual i either produces the private
good and works in the private sector (denoted ￿i = B; bakers, businessmen), or he is employed by
the public sector to produce the public good (￿i = P; nurses, physicians, teachers).
Note, however, that the "public" and "private" labels are chosen for ease of reference. The crucial
distinction between the two sectors is that workers in the "private" sector are paid according to the
value of their marginal productivity, while "public" employees are not. Hence, the distinction relates
4essentially neither to the fact that the public sector produces public goods, nor to ownership as such,
but to whether or not they are paid by their marginal productivity. Our main results would hold also
if public sector employees produced a publicly provided private good (for example individual health
care), or if the "public" sector were privately owned (e.g. private nursing homes), as long as e⁄ort
and productivity of its workers are non-veri￿able. Below, we will sometimes use the terms "bakers"
and "nurses" to refer to employees of the private and public sectors, respectively.
For bakers, individual output can be observed and veri￿ed, and performance pay can thus be used
even if e⁄ort is unobservable. It may be instructive to think of self-employed businesspeople who pro-
duce and sell a homogeneous good of perfectly observable quality to consumers at the current market
price (normalized here to 1). We assume that the consumption good market is perfectly competitive,
implying that all producers and consumers take the price of consumer goods as exogenously given.
Person i￿ s production of the consumption good (bread) is given by
￿(ei;￿i) =
0 if ￿i = P
f(ei) if ￿i = B
(2)
where f0 > 0;f00 < 0 (primes denote derivatives), and f(0) = 0. The individual is paid the market
value of his production, which is f(ei).5
For nurses, however, we assume that individual production cannot be observed by others: Only
the aggregate level G can be measured, so even though the worker herself knows how much she
contributed, this cannot be veri￿ed, because there is a large number of public employees.6 Person i￿ s
production of the public good is
￿(ei;￿i) =
0 if ￿i = B
g(ei) if ￿i = P
(3)




for all i, where G0 is an exogenous initial supply level. Individuals regard the public good provision
by others, G￿i = G0 +
X
j6=i
￿(ei;￿i); as exogenously ￿xed. We will also assume that ￿g0(0) < c0(0),
implying that the marginal public good bene￿t to i herself is never large enough to outweigh her e⁄ort
costs.
5For simplicity, this set-up presumes that the worker is, essentially, self-employed. The results would also hold, of
course, if he were employed at a wage re￿ecting the value of his output.
6If the public sector employees produced, instead, a private good, the problem of individual output measurement
could for example arise from limited veri￿ability of product quality (childcare), or from limited knowledge of the
production function for people outside a specialized profession (advanced medicine).
7Note that a given employee￿ s contribution depends only on her own e⁄ort, which simpli￿es the analysis.
5Public sector employees are paid a ￿xed wage w. These wages are ￿nanced through a lump sum





where N is the number of individuals in society, and M is the number of public sector employees.
The budget constraint for individual i is now
bi + t = y(ei;￿i), where
y(ei;￿i) = f(ei) if ￿i = B
y(ei;￿i) = w if ￿i = P.
(5)




i ￿(ei;￿i), follows from (4) and (5).
Now, let us turn to the self-image preference. "Being important" must certainly mean being
important to someone. In economics, the most common way to formalize importance is by means of a
social welfare function. Since we will be considering a Nash equilibrium, we are interested in the e⁄ects
of an agent￿ s action when everybody else￿ s actions are assumed to be ￿xed. Our basic assumption will
thus be as follows: Self-image is increasing in one￿ s net contribution to others￿welfare, taking others￿
behavior as ￿xed.
To be operational, this criterion must be speci￿ed further. First, assume that every individual i




[u(bj) ￿ c(ej) + ￿G] (6)
Here, others￿self-images are assumed not to be included in i￿ s judgement of their welfare. We
believe that there exist very good arguments for including self-image in social welfare judgements,
but also for excluding it. If i￿ s self-image is detemined by i￿ s "good deeds", one may argue that the
de￿nition of "good" should not depend on self-image; on the other hand, it is hard to claim that
self-image bene￿ts are less "real" than other bene￿ts. Assuming that W￿i =
P
j6=i Ui would, however,
complicate the analysis considerably; we have thus chosed to keep with the tractable speci￿cation.
Let W0
￿i(ei;￿i) denote others￿welfare as a function of i￿ s choices when others￿behaviors are kept
￿xed at their status quo levels ej = e0
j and ￿j = ￿0
j for every j 6= i. Next, note that a baker who
consumes exactly his own production of bread, and who pays no taxes, contributes exactly nil to
others￿welfare; hence, this is a natural benchmark. Let the constant Wbm
￿i denote others￿welfare in
the benchmark case, i.e. when i is a baker consuming exactly his own production, again assuming
that ej = e0
j and ￿j = ￿0





j6=i[u(bi) ￿ c(ei) + ￿G] s.t. ￿i = B; bi = f(ei), and ej = e0
j and ￿j = ￿0




Thus, self-image is proportional to the social value of i￿ s production, minus the social value of i￿ s
private consumption. The subtraction of Wbm
￿i in (7) secures that self-image is detemined by i￿ s own
contribution, and not by, for example, a policy change in￿ uencing others￿welfare.9 The proportionality
factor ￿i is assumed to be exogenous, but may vary between individuals. To rule out the case in which
people care more about others￿welfare than their own, we impose the restriction 0 ￿ ￿i < 1. If ￿i = 0,
our model corresponds to the standard Homo Oeconomicus model, while ￿i = 1 would imply that the
individual behaved as a benevolent dictator, caring just as much for others￿welfare as his own.
The desire to regard oneself as important to others is di⁄erent from a preference for others￿welfare
as such. Several interpretations have previously been suggested in the literature. For example, Francois
(2005) discusses the desire to "make a di⁄erence" assuming that workers care for the public good,
corresponding to Andreoni￿ s (1988) de￿nition of pure altruism. In Francois￿model, workers contribute
labor to public good production because there is a probability that no-one else will provide it; however,
in his model, workers have no preferences regarding their own role in the public good provision: Only
￿nal outcomes count. Dur and Glazer (2004, p.4) assume that "a person measures his impact of any
action he may take by comparing output in the current period to what it would have been had he
unexpectedly ceased to exist an instant before". In their approach, a worker feels important only to
the extent that others cannot replace his e⁄ort. Although Dur and Glazer￿ s approach is more explicitly
directed at the worker￿ s own role than Francois￿ , as in models of impure altruism (Andreoni 1990), it
shares Francois￿(2005) emphasis on actual ￿nal outcomes.
We believe, however, that "importance" can also be conceived as "taking part in the functioning
of society" in the sense that one ful￿lls an important, albeit not necessarily irreplacible, function. Our
approach is thus not related to the ease with which a worker can be replaced, but to his net contribution
to others￿welfare, given others￿behavior. If the social value of his production exceeds the social value
of the resources he claims for himself, we will assume that this makes him feel important, even if
someone else could have replaced him. Our de￿nition of "being important" thus di⁄ers from Francois￿
(2005) in our focus on the individual￿ s own role, not just on aggregate outcomes. It di⁄ers from both
Francois￿(2005) and Dur and Glazer￿ s (2004) in that importance is related to welfare, not to output,
and in that we assume that importance relates only to the welfare of others. These distictions imply
that in our model, but in neither Francois￿nor Dur and Glazer￿ s, pure transfers to or from i will
count in i￿ s perceived importance. Although transfers do not represent real costs for the economy as
a whole, they do represent welfare changes for others if net transfers are di⁄erent from zero. Note
9The subtraction of Wbm
￿i in (7) does not a⁄ect behavior.
7that this e⁄ect would be present even if we had used the alternative speci￿cation of others￿welfare
W￿i =
P
j6=i Ui in the self-image function (7), although the behavioral implications would then be
di⁄erent.
3 Choosing e⁄ort levels
For a given type of employment ￿i, individuals maximize their utility with respect to e⁄ort ei. Their
preferred type of employment is determined by the maximum utility level attainable in the two sec-
tors. Let Ui(ei;￿i) denote the utility individual i will get from choosing e⁄ort ei given the type of
employment ￿i.
Consider ￿rst the e⁄ort choice of private sector employees (￿i = B). To avoid unnecessary com-
plications, we will assume in the following that the optimal e⁄ort level is su¢ ciently high to cover the
lump-sum tax, so that the tax does not impose a binding restriction on the optimal choice of e⁄ort.
For the private sector worker, G￿i = G, and utility is given by





j) ￿ t) + ￿G ￿ c(e0
j)] ￿ Wbm
￿i ) (8)
Di⁄erentiation of this with respect to ei gives the following ￿rst order condition for private sector
workers￿utility maximization:
u0f0 = c0 (9)
This expression is independent of ￿i; indeed, it is exactly the same ￿rst order condition which
would have emerged from the Homo Oeconomicus model, corresponding to ￿i = 0 in our model: For
the private sector worker, a preference to be important to others does not a⁄ect the optimal e⁄ort
level.
To see this, note that in the present model there is only one private good (bread), which is also the
numeraire. Hence, any purchases of bread must be paid by an exactly equivalent amount of bread,
implying necessarily just a barter of equally valued goods, producing no real transfer of resources.
Consequently, the baker￿ s production always just covers his own consumption and his tax payment,
and on the margin, any changes in his production will be mirrored by corresponding changes in his
consumption. This result is not an artifact of the assumption of a single private good. In a model
with several consumer goods, a similar result would obtain: In competitive markets, where the baker
takes prices as given, marginal values are equalized in equilibrium, ensuring that the market value of
one￿ s production equals its social value for consumers. On the margin, market exchanges are simply
barters of resources of equal value, and the marginal transaction does not increase or decrease the
8welfare of others.10
How about the public sector worker (￿i = P)? Utility is, in her case, given by





j) ￿ t) + ￿(G + g(ei)) ￿ c(e0
j)] ￿ Wbm
￿i ) (10)
Di⁄erentiation with respect to ei thus yields the ￿rst order condition
￿g0[1 + ￿i(N ￿ 1)] = c0 (11)
For the nurse, the model with ￿i > 0 is obviously not behaviorally equivalent to Homo Oeconomi-
cus. A nurse with ￿i = 0 will exert no e⁄ort at all: The only reason to do so would be the resulting
extra public good bene￿ts to herself, but since, by assumption, ￿g0(0) < c0(0), this is not, for her,
worth the required e⁄ort.
When ￿i > 0, however, she will attach a strictly positive weight to the marginal public good
bene￿ts accruing to others, since this stimulates her sense of being important; hence, her preferred
e⁄ort level is higher than it would have been if ￿i = 0. However, due to the restriction 0 ￿ ￿i < 1,
we can conclude that she will only partially internalize this externality: The nurse will exert (weakly)
more e⁄ort than predicted by the Homo Oeconomicus model, but not enough to secure a socially
optimal public good provision.11
For future reference, denote the utility-maximizing e⁄ort for an individual with occupation ￿i and
motivation strength ￿i by e￿(￿i;￿i). In Lemma 9 in the Appendix, we show that e￿(P;￿i) is increasing
in ￿i. The baker￿ s e⁄ort is independent of ￿i, so we can also write e￿(B;￿i) = e￿B. To summarize:
Proposition 1 The baker￿ s e⁄ort is independent of ￿i, while the nurse￿ s e⁄ort is increasing in ￿i:
We cannot say whether, in general, e￿(P;￿i) ? e￿(B;￿i), i.e whether a given individual will exert
more e⁄ort when employed by the public or private sector. In the public sector there is no economic
incentive to exert e⁄ort, so if ￿i is low, e⁄ort can be negligible or even zero. On the other hand, if ￿i
is large, the desire to be important may push the individual to very high e⁄ort levels.
The conclusion so far is that even if businessmen and bakers ￿in general, those who are paid by
their marginal productivity ￿behave in line with predictions from the standard Homo Oeconomicus
model, while nurses and physicians do not, this need not imply that bakers and nurses, or businessmen
and physicians, have di⁄erent preferences. They might all prefer to keep a self-image as someone who
10See Kirchsteiger and Dufwenberg (2007). Note, however, that if taxes were increasing in income, ￿i would enter
the baker￿ s ￿rst order condition for optimal e⁄ort. A formal analysis of this is outside the scope of the present paper.
Nevertheless, if ￿i is su¢ ciently small, the baker would still prefer to keep his income rather than paying taxes, and
most of our results would be unchanged.
11Here, "socially optimal" should be interpreted as the level maximizing W =
PN
j=1[u(bj) ￿ c(ej) + ￿G]:
9is important to others, but this preference has no behavioral consequences for those whose marginal
e⁄ort is compensated by its marginal social value. As pointed out by Adam Smith, acting according to
one￿ s own material interests is also in society￿ s interest in a perfectly competitive market; the preference
to be important will hence not push the baker in a di⁄erent direction than market incentives do. On
the other hand, for those whose e⁄orts are bene￿cial to society over and above the compensation they
receive, the desire to be important gives an extra incentive to work hard.
4 Choosing type of employment
When considering which type of employment to seek, the worker will compare the maximum utility
he can obtain in each type of job. Assume that i is employed in the private sector, that there is a
vacancy in the public sector, and that he is considering whether to apply for it. If he switches jobs, he
gets the opportunity to be important through producing the public good, to the bene￿t of everyone
in society. He also, however, gets the opportunity to shirk. Finally, his income may of course change,
depending on the public wage w and his productivity in the private sector.
Consider, ￿rst, the e⁄ects on self-image as important to others. We will show that self-image can
either increase or decrease, depending on whether his e⁄ort in the new position will be su¢ ciently
high to justify the increased tax burden he imposes on others.
Let ￿W0
￿i(￿i) denote the increased welfare for others if i moves from the private to the public
sector, all else given, i.e., ￿W0
￿i(￿i) = W0
￿i(e￿(P;￿i);P)￿W0
￿i(e￿(B;￿i);B). The gain in self-image
for individual i by moving from the private to public sector is then given by
￿Si = ￿i￿W0
￿i(￿i) (12)
If i moves to the public sector, the number of nurses M will increase by one, and public good
production will weakly increase; by how much depends on ￿i, the strength of his work motivation.
On the other hand, taxes must ￿nance wages for one more nurse. Recall that t = Mw
N , so ￿t
￿M = w
N
is the tax increase required to ￿nance i￿ s entry into the public sector.
Assume that ￿t is marginal in the sense that the resulting change in utility ￿u is approximately







j) ￿ t ￿ ￿tg ￿ ufy(e0
j;￿0
j) ￿ tg + ￿g(e￿(P;￿i))] (13)




where u0 is evaluated at y(e0
j;￿0
j) ￿ t.
10This expression can be positive or negative, depending on the level of ￿i. First, it can easily be
shown that ￿W0
￿i(￿i) is increasing in ￿i (see Lemma 10 in the Appendix): The stronger i￿ s desire to
be important, the harder he will work in the public sector, and the more useful it is to others that
he moves there. Moreover, it is evident that ￿W0
￿i(0) < 0: If a worker with no concern for being
important (￿i = 0) moves into the public sector, he will produce nothing, while still claiming his wage,
which must be ￿nanced by others￿increased tax payments; hence the change in others￿welfare will
be strictly negative. Consequently, there must be an ^ ￿ 2 [0;1] such that ￿W0
￿i(￿i) > 0 for ￿i > ^ ￿,
￿W0
￿i(￿i) = 0 for ￿i = ^ ￿, and ￿W0
￿i(￿i) < 0 for ￿i < ^ ￿.12 In the following, we will assume that
^ ￿ < 1, which we believe to be the most interesting case: If this did not hold, no-one, not even the
most strongly motivated, would consider work in the public sector socially bene￿cial.
This leads to the following preliminary conclusion: Self-image increases when i moves to the public
sector if his work motivation is strong (￿i > ^ ￿), but decreases if his motivation is weak (￿i < ^ ￿).
However, it is not only self-image which counts: An individual with work motivation ￿i will
prefer to work in the public sector if his maximum utility in the public sector exceeds the maximum
utility he can attain in the private sector. Let UP = maxei Ui(ei;P), UB = maxei Ui(ei;B) and
￿U(￿i) = UP ￿ UB: Then, i will prefer public employment if the following expression is positive:
￿U(￿i) = u(w ￿ t ￿ ￿t) ￿ u(f(e￿B) ￿ t) ￿ c(e￿(P;￿i)) + c(e￿B) + ￿g(e￿(P;￿i)) + ￿i￿W0
￿i(￿i) (14)
Proposition 2 establishes that ￿U(￿i) is U-shaped, and speci￿es the values of ￿i for which ￿U(￿i)
is positive, implying that the individual prefers working in the public sector.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. The intuition is as follows: For a worker with very low motivation,
working in the public sector is attractive because it enables him to shirk. The negative ￿W0
￿i(￿i) is
no substantial worry to him, since he cares little about others￿welfare. If ￿i is very high, a public job
is attractive because it o⁄ers the opportunity to be important to others. For intermediate values of
￿i, however, the private sector is most attractive: For low, intermediate values, ￿W0
￿i(￿i) is negative,
and this bothers the individual enough that he prefers the private sector. For high, intermediate
values, his e⁄ort in the public sector would increase others￿welfare and increase self-image, but the
self-image gain is insu¢ cient to justify the required e⁄ort costs.13
Proposition 2 a) ￿U(￿i) is declining in ￿i for ￿i < ^ ￿ and increasing in ￿i for ￿i > ^ ￿, while for
￿i = ^ ￿, @￿U(￿)=@￿i = 0. b) Moreover, there exist ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 such that ￿U(￿i) < 0 for ￿i 2 (￿; ￿ ￿),
while ￿U(￿) ￿ 0 for ￿i 2 [0;￿][ [￿ ￿;1].
Proof. See the Appendix.
12Note that ^ ￿ is a function of model parameters such as w and M. To simplify notation, we disregard this here.
13This corresponds to the ￿ndings of Dur and Delfgaauw (2004) and Prendergast (2006).
11Figure 1: Di⁄erences in self-image and utility
Note that ￿U(￿i) depends on the tax level t, which in turn depends on the number of nurses. A
Nash equilibrium is then a tax level and corresponding ￿; ￿ ￿ such that all i with ￿i 2 [0;￿][ [￿ ￿;1] are
nurses and all others are bakers, and such that the tax level is consistent with these choices.14
5 The detrimental self-image e⁄ect of unemployment
Before turning to the question of how to attract the motivated nurses while avoiding the unmotivated
ones, let us brie￿ y point out one interesting implication of our model.
While it is well documented that there is a substantial negative correlation between unemployment
and individuals￿reported happiness and life satisfaction, as well as more objective measures like health
and longevity (e.g. Lane 1991, Oswald 1997, Theodossiou 1998), the standard Homo Economicus
model provides no explanation to this phenomenon: If unemployment bene￿ts were su¢ ciently large,
14That this is a Nash equilibrium follows since self-image is de￿ned taking others￿behavior as ￿xed.
12Homo Economicus￿utility would in fact increase if he became unemployed, due to the reduced cost
of e⁄ort.
With a preference structure like the one proposed here, however, unemployment can have a detri-
mental e⁄ect on utility through a reduced self-image, which is not necessarily outweighted by the
reduced cost of e⁄ort. Indeed, a commonly heard complaint from unemployed people is that "no-one
has a need for you"; a concern which seems to be closely related to a preference to be important to
others.
Assume, for the moment, that in addition to employment in either the public or the private
sector, there is a third possibility, namely unemployment; i.e. ￿i = fB;P;Zg, where ￿i = Z denotes
unemployment. Let ￿(ei;Z) = ￿(ei;Z) = 0; that is, the e⁄ort of the unemployed has no productive
use; and let the ￿xed unemployment bene￿t be ￿ > 0. We assume, for simplicity, that the unemployed




When a baker becomes unemployed, the tax increase is ￿
N > 0. If a nurse get unemployed, ￿w￿￿
N ;
in this case, the sign of the tax change depends on whether the unemployment bene￿t ￿ is higher
or lower than the nurse￿ s wage w. Moreover, when a nurse becomes unemployed, public production
decreases.
It should be immediately obvious that the optimal e⁄ort of an unemployed person is e￿(Z;￿i) = 0,
since the unemployed￿ s e⁄ort is of no social use in this model. Denoting the self-image change of a
private sector worker who becomes unemployed ￿SB




￿i(e￿(P;￿i);P)] ￿ 0 (15)
Using a linearization like in (13), with ￿ u = 1
N￿1
P
￿i u0 denoting average marginal utility, we ￿nd
Proposition 3 a) The change in self-image for a private sector employee who becomes unemployed
is
￿SB
i ￿ ￿￿i￿￿ u ￿ 0
b) The change in self-image for a public sector employee who becomes unemployed is
￿SP
i ￿ ￿￿[(N ￿ 1)￿g(e￿(P;￿);P)) + (￿ ￿ w)￿ u]
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that the baker￿ s self-image is always reduced if he becomes unemployed (strictly reduced if
￿i > 0). If a baker were consuming exactly his own production of bread, his self-image would be zero
13(by de￿nition). Nevertheless, every private sector worker, while always consuming his own production
on the margin, actually makes a strictly positive net contribution to society through his tax payments.
An unemployed person￿ s net contribution, however, is strictly negative: He produces nothing, while
consuming ￿ ￿ t > 0. His consumption must be ￿nanced by others￿e⁄orts.
For a public sector worker, the self-image impact of potential unemployment depends on how much
e⁄ort she exerts, which depends, in turn, on ￿i. If she excerts low e⁄ort, then it may well be the case
that her net contribution to society is negative; this would be the case if
(N ￿ 1)￿g(e￿(P;￿i);P)) < (w ￿ t)￿ u:
The net contribution as an unemployed is also negative, approximately equal to ￿(￿ ￿t)￿ u. However,
if the unemployement bene￿t is lower than the wage as a nurse, the nurse will be a larger burder for
tax payers when employed than when unemployed, and if her e⁄ort is su¢ ciently low, her public good
provision cannot compensate for the additional burden to other tax payers. In this case her self-image
will in fact be higher as unemployed than as employed.
Hence, when losing his job, the only worker who does not experience a loss of self-image is the
shirking nurse. Nevertheless, the Proposition below establishes that if the unemployment bene￿t pro-
vided exact income compensation, every nurse who provides a strictly positive e⁄ort would experience
a utility loss if losing her job, and in this case no nurse will strictly bene￿t from unemployment. More-
over, highly motivated bakers would also lose utility if losing their job; but the most poorly motivated
bakers can actually stricly gain.
Proposition 4 a) Let ￿ = w. Then, every nurse for whom e￿(P;￿i) > 0 would experience a utility
loss if she lost her job. For a nurse with e￿(P;￿i) = 0, utility is una⁄ected by becoming unemployed.
b) Let ￿ = f(e￿
B). Then, a baker will lose utility when losing his job if ￿i is su¢ ciently high, that is,
if ￿i > c(e￿
B)=￿￿ u.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In our model framework, being unemployed is formally equivalent to living o⁄ any kind of tax-
￿nanced social security payments, such as sickness or disability bene￿ts. Hence, our model provides
also one possible explanation to the fact that even in the Scandinavian countries, with their relatively
generous social security systems, many individuals do not exploit the welfare state to the extent they
actually could. In Norway, for example, employed workers can be absent for three working days,
three times each calendar year, with no loss of income, if they claim being sick (without a sickness
certi￿cate from a physician). Nevertheless, although some individuals seem to exploit this system, it
is obviously not the case that all workers take care to spend their entire "quota" of sick leave days
14(nor does it, from casual observation, seem very common). Propositions 3 and 4 above, however,
show that the self-image e⁄ect of making negative contributions to others￿welfare can be su¢ ciently
large to make many workers prefer not to exploit the welfare system by pretending to be sick ￿even
when sickness bene￿ts provide full income compensation and the expected penalty for making a false
sickness claim is zero.15 This seems to ￿t nicely with the results of Aronsson et al. (2000), who asked
almost 3801 Swedish respondents whether they had been at work recently at occassions when their
health condition, in their own view, indicated that they ought to have stayed home: "Members of
occupational groups whose everyday tasks are to provide care or welfare services, or teach or instruct,
have a substantially increased risk of being at work when sick" (p. 502).
6 Attracting the devoted nurses
Assume, now, that ￿i 2 [0;1i is drawn from an approximately continuous distribution16, and that
￿i is unobservable. Di⁄erent individuals then have di⁄erent incentives to seek the two types of jobs.
Since e⁄ort in the private sector is una⁄ected by work motivation, while e⁄ort is increasing in work
motivation in the public sector, it would be socially preferable if the highly motivated could somehow
be attracted into the public sector. However, since motivation is unobservable, and public jobs can
also be attractive to poorly motivated shirkers, this is not trivial.17
The lower the public sector wage w, the less attractive are public jobs to shirkers. Denote by ￿ w
the wage for which the very least motivated (￿i = 0) is exactly indi⁄erent between the public and
private sectors, i.e. a wage such that ￿U(0) = 0. We will now explore whether the government can
set the wage w such that public sector jobs are attractive only to the highly motivated, while keeping
the poorly motivated in the sector with performance pay. In the following, we will focus on situations
such that if w = ￿ w, then ￿ ￿ < 1.18
If one more person becomes a nurse, every member of society has to pay slightly more taxes, ￿t.
Assume that ￿t￿u0 < c(e￿B), which seems a very reasonable assumption. Then, it follows, as we show
formally in Lemma 12 in the Appendix, that
￿ w < f(e￿
B): (16)
15For an analysis of social interaction e⁄ects in norms to live o⁄ welfare, see Lindbeck et al. (1999).
16That is: the distribution covers the entire interval [0;1).
17For related analyses, see Frank 2003, Heyes 2004, Dur and Delfgaauw (2004), Brekke and Nyborg 2004.
18If ￿ ￿ < 1 does not hold, the desire to be important, although present, is too weak to compensate workers for
their e⁄ort, and no highly motivated worker will apply for a job as a nurse. Hence, this case reproduces the Homo
Oeconomicus prediction that any nurse will be a shirker. While this is certainly conceivable, we will focus on the case
where ￿ ￿ < 1 for w = ￿ w precisely because this is when our approach di⁄ers from the standard model.
15In words: To make the very least motivated indi⁄erent between the two types of jobs, bakers￿
income must be higher than nurses￿￿to compensate bakers for the inconvenience of not being able
to shirk, like they could have done in the public sector. Hence, in a world with only dedicated nurses,
those nurses must necessarily earn less than employees in the private sector.
What happens if the government sets the wage equal to w = ￿ w? For a person with ￿i = 0, the
bene￿t of moving to the public sector, ￿U(0), is then, by de￿nition, zero. According to Proposition
2, we know that as ￿i increases, ￿U(￿i) will then ￿rst be decreasing and then increasing. When ￿i
reaches ￿ ￿, ￿U(￿i) is, again, zero. When ￿i exceeds ￿ ￿, however, ￿U(￿i) becomes strictly positive.
Hence, when w = ￿ w, only those with a motivation higher than ￿ ￿ will prefer public employment.
It turns out, however, that for any distribution of ￿i satisfying our assumptions, setting w = ￿ w will
lead to a suboptimally low production of the public good: To avoid attracting at least some shirkers,
the size of the public sector has to be kept too low compared to the ￿rst-best.




[u(bj) ￿ c(ej) + ￿G] (17)
Further, de￿ne the the ￿rst-best social optimum as the hypothetical situation in which W is maximized
with respect to ei and ￿i, disregarding any incentive problems.20 Then, we have the following result:
Proposition 5 If ￿i is approximately continuously distributed, then for w = ￿ w the public sector is
smaller than the ￿rst-best optimum.
Proof. See the Appendix.
6.1 Changing the wage
For w > ￿ w, the public sector will hire both the least and the most motivated. There are two marginal
individuals, one with low and one with high work motivation. For the least motivated marginal
individual, ￿W￿i < 0. Thus, others￿welfare declines as this individual moves into the public sector.




[u(bj) ￿ c(ej) + ￿G + Sj]
Including self-image in the social welfare function would have negligible e⁄ects on the ranking of social states as long
as the policy to be evaluated does not change the benchmark state. However, many policies will a⁄ect the bechmark,
and in such cases the choice of social welfare function matters for normative conclusions.
20Note that we have not claimed that ￿ w is a second-best optimal wage level. This requires further analysis since w
a⁄ects not only e¢ ciency, but also the income distribution.
16As the wage level increases, and more people are attracted to the public sector, taxes will increase.
Eventually, yj ￿t will become very low. Hence, if the wage is too high, it could happen that only the
least motivated prefer to work in the public sector, while highly motivated individuals feel more useful
in the private sector. Let w￿ denote the highest wage level where the most motivated still prefer the
public sector, and where at least one individual prefer the private sector. The next Proposition is
illustrated by Figure 2.
Proposition 6 For any wage level w￿ > w > ￿ w, at least one individual i exists who will be attracted
into the public sector by a wage increase, such that
￿W0
￿i(￿i) < 0;
while at the same time there exists at least one worker j; not attracted by a wage increase and thus
left in the private sector, such that
￿W￿j(￿j) > 0:
Thus, because work motivation ￿i is unobservable, the allocation of workers between the public and
private sector will never be ￿rst-best optimal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above proposition established that when w > ￿ w, the public sector always attracts some
shirkers, while some relatively highly motivated workers are left in the private sector. In fact, Lemma
10, given in the appendix, demonstrates that increasing nurses￿wage has a stronger recruitment e⁄ect
for potential shirkers than for highly motivated workers.
Lemma 7 Assume that w￿ > w > ￿ w. Then, a marginal increase in w increases ￿U(￿j) more than
￿U(￿i) if ￿i > ￿j.
Proof. See the Appendix.
6.2 Improving nurses￿working conditions
If the regulator cannot hire a su¢ ciently large number of devoted nurses by increasing their wage,
without at the same time attracting even higher numbers of shirkers, one may want to look for
alternative policy tools. Are there available instruments which would make working as a nurse more
attractive to the highly motivated, but not to the shirkers?
Intuition suggests that this might be the case. Consider, for example, a devoted nurse who tries
to prevent the spread of an infectious disease, and who wants to provide important information to
17Figure 2: ￿U(￿) for di⁄erent wage levels
18high-risk groups who do not visit her o¢ ce on their own initiative. However, the government has
provided her with very poor working conditions: she has neither a car nor internet access from her
o¢ ce. Such working conditions must obviously be unattractive for a worker who cares about being
important. For a worker who doesn￿ t care, and who simply wants to shirk and collect her wage, the
opportunity to do a good job will not matter much.
Let ￿ be an investment which has a "public good" property in the sense that once the investment
has been made, it increases the productivity of all nurses (think of, for example, roentgen equipment; to
make the example clear-cut, the capital input should improve nurses￿productivity while not a⁄ecting
their material utility directly). Thus, in the production function for the public good (3), replace g(ei)
by a function ^ g(ei;￿), such that each nurse￿ s production is given by gi = ^ g(ei;￿) where ^ g0
e > 0, ^ g0
￿ ￿ 0,
^ g00
ee < 0, and ^ g00
￿￿ < 0. Moreover, assume that ^ g(0;￿) = 0, i.e. capital investment is of no use unless
nurses exert at least some e⁄ort. (This implies that ^ g0
￿(0;￿) = 0; but we will assume that ^ g0
￿ > 0 for





Intuitively, if the common equipment ￿ increases nurses￿marginal productivity, motivated nurses
will work harder the better equipped the public sector is. Moreover, the better opportunities to be
important as a nurse, the more attractive it will be to become a nurse for those with high motivation.
Proposition 8 establishes that this is indeed the case here.
Proposition 8 a) For a nurse who initially provides a strictly positive e⁄ort, an increase in the
capital input ￿ increases e⁄ort if ^ g00
e￿ > 0; it leaves e⁄ort unchanged if ^ g00
e￿ = 0, and decreases e⁄ort
if ^ g00
e￿ < 0. b) For a worker with ￿i = 0, an increase in the capital input ￿ does not a⁄ect the
attractiveness of public employment. For a worker with ￿i > 0, who would exert a strictly positive
e⁄ort level if employed as a nurse, public employment becomes strictly more attractive when the capital
input ￿ increases, provided that ^ g00
e￿ ￿ 0. If ^ g00
e￿ < 0, being a nurse could become either more or less
attractive when ￿ increases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
For a given wage, more devoted workers can be recruited by increasing nurses￿opportunities to
do a good job: The higher the investment ￿, the more attractive it is for motivated workers to be a
nurse; and the higher one￿ s work motivation ￿i, the stronger is the motivational e⁄ect of increasing
investments. The exception is if ^ g00
e￿ < 0, which means that the capital input makes the nurse￿ s work,
on the margin, less useful. This should be no surprise. Of course, the reverse also holds: If the
government reduces capital input, making devoted nurses￿working conditions harder (assuming that
19^ g00
e￿ ￿ 0), being a nurse will become less attractive; the more so for the highly motivated workers.
Consequently, there are two good reasons for the government to provide capital: First, it is productive
per se; but secondly, it improves recruitment of motivated workers to the public sector. The latter
provides, in fact, a reason for the government to "overinvest" in the nursing sector.
If the investment were, instead, worker speci￿c (i.e. a ￿xed capital input per worker), i￿ s choice
to become a nurse would imply a marginally higher tax payment for every individual. In this case,
the motivational e⁄ect of increased capital input works only up to the point where it would anyway
be socially e¢ cient to increase capital input; thus, with ￿xed per worker capital input there is no
argument for overinvestment. For a formal analysis of this case, see the Appendix.
7 Conclusions
Above, we have formalized the idea that work is not only motivated by its monetary compensation,
but also by a desire to be important to other people. We have shown that with lump-sum taxation, the
desire to be important does not change the behavior of individuals receiving performance pay (bakers);
it does, however, change the behavior of those whose performance cannot be e¢ ciently monitored and
who thus are not paid according to their marginal productivity (nurses).
With this preference structure, public sector jobs may be attractive for two very di⁄erent reasons:
they provide the opportunity to shirk, but also the opportunity to be important. This implies that
unless the public sector wage is kept strictly lower than income in the private sector, shirkers will be
attracted to the public sector. On the other hand, if the wage is kept low enough to keep the shirkers
out, the public sector will be suboptimally small.
If nurses￿productivity can be increased through ￿xed capital investments, however, higher in-
vestments will make nursing more attractive to motivated workers; more so the higher the worker￿ s
motivation. For a regulator trying to attract more devoted nurses while keeping shirkers out, in-
vesting in nurses￿opportunity to do a good job can be a better policy instrument than increasing
nurses￿wages. This argument provides a rationale for overinvestment in certain types of public sector
production capital.
Furthermore, our model provides one possible explanation why unemployment seems to be asso-
ciated with a loss of utility. Within the present framework, both private and public sector workers
experience a loss of self-image when losing their job, and the higher a worker￿ s motivation, the larger
is her self-image loss. The only group who would not experience a loss of self-image when losing their
jobs are the shirking nurses. Workers￿self-image loss is not necessarily compensated by the decreased
cost of e⁄ort. In fact, in the case of full income compensation through unemployment bene￿ts, every
20nurse who provides a strictly positive e⁄ort would become worse o⁄ if losing her job. The same would
hold for bakers whose work motivation is relatively high. For poorly motivated bakers, however, the
loss of self-image would be more than compensated by the reduced e⁄ort costs, and utility as un-
employed would thus be higher than when working as a baker. A similar argument holds for other
types of welfare payments. Our model would thus predict that although some individuals will exploit
a generous welfare state, choosing, if they get the option, to live o⁄ welfare rather than working,
many groups of workers would rather prefer to work, keeping up a good self-image as someone who is
important to others.
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A Proofs
Lemma 9 For public sector employees, the optimal e⁄ort e￿(P;￿i), and hence also provision g(e￿(P;￿i)),
are non-decreasing and increasing in ￿i for e￿(P;￿i) > 0.
Proof. Optimal e⁄ort e￿(P;￿i) > 0 is the solution to the equation
(1 + ￿i(N ￿ 1))￿g0(ei) = c0(ei)
where c0(ei) is increasing in ei, while g0(ei) is decreasing. A positive shift in the left hand side will
then yield equality at a higher value of ei. Note that since ￿g0(0) < c0(0),





and in this area g(e￿(P;￿i)) = e￿(P;￿i) = 0:
Lemma 10 The change in others￿welfare if i moves from the private to the public sector, ￿W0
￿i(￿i),
is non-decreasing in the strength of i￿ s motivation ￿i, and increasing for e￿(P;￿i) > 0.
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Since @e￿(P;￿i)=@￿i > 0, for e￿(P;￿i) > 0 as shown in Lemma 9, it follows that @￿W0
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￿i(￿i) is nondecreasing, and increasing for e￿(P;￿i) > 0, as in stated in Lemma 10, it
follows that ￿U(￿i) is weakly convex, and strictly convex for e￿(P;￿i) > 0. Similarly it follows that
￿U(￿i) is decreasing for ￿i < ^ ￿ and increasing for ￿i > ^ ￿.
b) From a) and Lemma 10, we know that ￿U(￿i) is linear and declining for small ￿i until e￿(P;￿i) > 0
and then strictly convex. It follows that ￿U(￿i) = 0 for at most two di⁄erent values of ￿i. De￿ne
a threshold value ￿ such ￿ = 0 if ￿U(0) < 0 and otherwise ￿U(￿) = 0. Similarly, ￿ ￿ = 1 if
￿U(1) < 0 and otherwise ￿U(￿ ￿) = 0: Then, also by the concavity of ￿U(￿i), it follows that
￿U(￿i) < 0 for ￿i 2 (￿; ￿ ￿), while ￿U(￿i) > 0 for ￿i 2 [0;￿)[ (￿ ￿;1].
Proposition 3
Proof. a) Let ￿BZ denote changes when an individual moves from the private sector to unemploy-
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where ￿BUt is the change in tax required to maintain budget balance. Now, since the person now
24receives unemployment bene￿ts ￿, to maintain budget balance the tax changes for others are ￿BUt =










u0 = ￿￿i￿￿ u.








j) ￿ t ￿ ￿PZtg ￿ ufy(e0
j;￿0
j) ￿ tg + ￿g(e￿(P;￿i))] (20)




As a nurse, the net transfer from others to the individual is w ￿ t, while when unemployed, the net
transfer is ￿ ￿ t. Thus ￿PZt = (￿ ￿ w)=(N ￿ 1), and we get
dSP = ￿i [(N ￿ 1)￿g(e￿(P;￿i)) ￿ (￿ ￿ w)￿ u]
Proposition 4
Proof. a) Note ￿rst that a nurse who provides no e⁄ort will have the exact same utility as an
unemployed who recieves the same public income and also makes no contribution to society. A nurse
who chooses e￿(P;￿i) > 0 does so because this yields a higher utility than ei = 0: Hence her utility
must be higher as a nurse than it would have been as unemployed, since in the latter case her e⁄ort
is unproductive. b) For a baker with ￿i = 0 the only utility change caused by unemployment is due
to a reduction in the e⁄ort cost, c(e￿
B): Hence he is strictly better o⁄ as unemployed. But the cost of
e⁄ort is independent of ￿i, while the change in self-image is dSB
i ￿ ￿￿i￿￿ u < 0, which depends on ￿i.







Proof. Note that with a continuous distribution and ￿ ￿ < 1, there will be an individual such that
￿i = ￿ ￿. This i will be indi⁄erent between public or private sector employment (￿U(￿ ￿) = 0). For the
individual with ￿i = 0 we know that he is indi⁄erent when w = ￿ w, thus
u( ￿ w ￿ t ￿ ￿t) = u(f(e￿
B) ￿ t) ￿ c(e￿
B)
Now, e￿
B is independent of ￿i, so this equality holds for all ￿i. Inserting in (14), using ￿U(￿ ￿) = 0,
we get
￿c(e￿(P; ￿ ￿)) + ￿g(e￿(P; ￿ ￿)) + ￿ ￿￿W0
￿i(￿ ￿) = 0
25When ￿ ￿ < 1, this implies that the welfare e⁄ect for others is stricly larger than the private net cost
for the marginal public sector worker: The "￿rst" worker in the private sector, i.e. the private sector
worker with the highest ￿i, agrees that the increased welfare for others, had he chosen to move to the
public sector, would have exceeded the private net costs for himself. However, since his ￿i < 1, he
places less emphasis on others￿welfare than on his own; consequently, he is not willing to move. From
a social point of view, thus, the size of the public sector is too small.21
Lemma 6
Proof. By Proposition 2, ￿U is U-shaped, and as w￿ > w > ￿ w it follows from the de￿nition of w￿
and ￿ w, that ￿U(0) > 0 and ￿U(1) > 0; and ￿U(￿i) < 0 for some ￿i. As seen in ￿gure 2, this implies
that ￿U(￿i) = 0 for two values of ￿i, one (￿i) where ￿U is downward sloping, and one (￿j) where it
is upwardsloping. Next, by lemma 11 in the appendix, @
@￿ [￿U(￿i)] = ￿W0
￿i(￿i). The claim follows.
Lemma 12 . Denote by ￿ w a wage such that ￿U(0) = 0, then if c(e￿B) > u( ￿ w ￿ t) ￿ ( ￿ w ￿ t ￿ ￿t)
￿ w < f(e￿
B): (21)
Proof. This implies that
u( ￿ w ￿ t ￿ ￿t) = u(f(e￿B) ￿ t) + c(e￿(P;0)) ￿ c(e￿B) ￿ ￿g(e￿(P;0)) ￿ ￿i￿W0
￿i(0)
=) u( ￿ w ￿ t ￿ ￿t) = u(f(e￿B) ￿ t) ￿ c(e￿B)
=) u( ￿ w ￿ t) ￿ u(f(e￿B) ￿ t) = ￿c(e￿B) + u( ￿ w ￿ t) ￿ ( ￿ w ￿ t ￿ ￿t)
Since, by assumption, c(e￿B) > u( ￿ w ￿t)￿( ￿ w ￿t ￿￿t); if follows that u( ￿ w ￿t) < u(f(e￿B)￿t), and
hence
￿ w < f(e￿
B): (22)
Lemma 7

































)u0 ￿ ￿i￿ u
21Note that even if we have, for simplicity, assumed a linear utility of the public good, the socially optimal size of the
public sector is limited by the concave and increasing utility of income.
26assuming that u0 is una⁄ected by the required marginal increase in taxes. The ￿rst part of this,
(1 ￿ 1





Proof. a) Nurses￿￿rst order condition for utility maximization with respect to e⁄ort is now
￿^ g0
e(1 + ￿i(N ￿ 1)) = c0 (23)




￿(1 + ￿i(N ￿ 1))^ g00
e￿
(c00 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿i(N ￿ 1))^ g00
ee)
(24)
Since c00 > 0, and ^ g00
ee < 0, the denominator is strictly positive. The numerator has the same sign as
^ g00
e￿. Hence, for interior solutions, the change in individually optimal e⁄ort when ￿ increases has the
same sign as ^ g00
e￿.
b) If i decides to become a nurse, the required change in taxes per person equals w
N = ￿t. i will
prefer public employment if the following expression is positive:
￿U(￿i) = u(w￿t￿￿t)￿u(f(e￿B)￿t)￿c(^ e￿(P;￿i;￿))+c(e￿B)+￿^ g(^ e￿(P;￿i;￿);￿)+￿i￿W0
￿i(￿i) (25)
where ei = ^ e￿(P;￿i;￿) is the utility maximizing e⁄ort for a nurse with motivation ￿i when the capital
input equals ￿, implicitly given by (23). Di⁄erentiation of ￿U(￿i) with respect to ￿, using (13) and
where dei



















([1 + ￿i(N ￿ 1)]￿^ g0
e ￿ c0) + ￿^ g0





e(N ￿ 1) + ￿^ g0
￿(N ￿ 1)] + ￿^ g0
￿ (28)
By assumption, ^ g(0;￿) = 0. Hence, if ei = 0, ￿^ g0
￿ must equal zero. Recall that workers with ￿i = 0
provide no e⁄ort. Eq. (26) then shows that if ￿i = 0,
d￿U(0)
d￿ = 0. For those with ￿i > 0 and an
interior utility maximum in e⁄ort (ei > 0),
d￿U(￿i)
d￿ is always strictly positive if dei
d￿ ￿ 0, i.e. when
^ g00
e￿ ￿ 0, and the value of
d￿U(￿i)
d￿ is then increasing in ￿i. If ^ g00
e￿ < 0, however,
d￿U(￿i)
d￿ may be either
positive or negative.
B Fixed capital investment per nurse
Assume that there is a ￿xed capital input K per nurse, so that (3) is replaced by
￿(ei;￿i) =
0 if ￿i = B
gi = ~ g(ei;K) if ￿i = P
(29)
27where ~ g0
e > 0, ~ g0
K > 0, ~ g00
ee < 0, and ~ g00
KK < 0: For simplicity, assume that ~ g00






Then, the ￿rst order condition for utility maximization with respect to e⁄ort is
[(1 + ￿i(N ￿ 1))￿~ g0
e(ei;K) = c0(ei)] (31)
and nurses￿e⁄ort is una⁄ected by changes in K, due to the assumption ~ g00
eK = 0 and similar arguments
as above.
Assume that i works in the private sector. If she moves to the public sector, the number of nurses
M will increase by one, and taxes increase by ￿~ t = w+K
N . Let ￿~ t be marginal in the sense that for
every j, we can neglect its impact on the marginal utility of income. i will prefer public employment
if the following expression is positive:
￿U(￿i) = u(w￿~ t￿￿~ t)￿u(f(e￿B)￿~ t)￿c(~ e￿(P;￿i;K))+c(e￿B)+￿~ g(~ e￿(P;￿i;K);K)+￿i￿W0
￿i(￿i)
(32)
where ~ e￿(P;￿i;K) is implicitly determined by (31). To see how the choice of occupation varies with







u0 + ￿i[(N ￿ 1)￿~ g0
K ￿ ￿ u] (33)
If the public good bene￿ts for others exceed the value of others￿increased tax costs, then ￿i[(N ￿
1)￿~ g0
K ￿ ￿ u] > 0 for every ￿i > 0. ￿~ g0
K is the increase in the individual￿ s own public good bene￿t; and
1
Nu0 is the consumption loss in terms of her own extra tax payment to ￿nance the increase in K. The
two latter are independent of ￿i, but are presumably both small, possibly negigible. Thus, when K
increases, it becomes relatively more attractive to be a nurse, provided that [1 + ￿i(N ￿ 1)]￿~ g0
K >
￿i￿ u + 1
Nu0 (that is, the individual thinks the extra tax payments are worth it); and the increase is
larger the higher ￿i. Note, however, that if [(N ￿ 1)￿~ g0
K ￿ ￿ u] > 0, the capital investment would be
socially e¢ cient even in the absence of self-selection problems. With a ￿xed per nurse investment,
thus, overinvestment in capital is never a good idea.






)u0 ￿ ￿i￿ u
assuming that u0 is una⁄ected by the required marginal increase in taxes. If the regulator decreases







= ￿i(N ￿ 1)￿~ g0
K + ￿~ g0
K ￿ u0




dw = ￿~ g0
K ￿ u0: It seems reasonable to assume that
￿~ g0




dw will always be negative for a person with ￿i = 0. However, there
will be a threshold value
￿￿ =
u0 ￿ ￿~ g0
K
(N ￿ 1)￿~ g0
K
such that for every ￿i > ￿￿, a decrease in the wage by one dollar, along with an increase in the capital
input per worker by one dollar, would make being a nurse more attractive, while for ￿i < ￿￿, being a
nurse would become less attractive. For this to be relevant, we must have ￿￿ < 1. This implies that
N￿~ g0
K > u0, which seems reasonable.
29